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Introduction
The phrase “multiple payment systems” 
typically brings to mind objects such as checks,
credit cards, debit cards and, more recently,
“smart” cards. However, many countries through-
out history have used more than one currency
at a time. In fact, although we tend to forget 
it, the use of multiple currencies as media of
exchange in the United States was common
into the 1930s. Until their abolition in 1935, 
privately issued banknotes were commonly
used simultaneously with government-fiat and
commodity-backed money. During its bimet-
allism period, the United States used two dif-
ferent government-issued commodity monies:
gold and silver coins. More recently, we
observe two-currency payment systems in
developing and transitional economies, in
which many modern payment systems are
unavailable. Nevertheless, citizens may adopt a
dual-payment system by using the dollar in
addition to their own locally issued fiat cur-
rency as a medium of exchange, store of value,
and unit of account. Indeed, this practice con-
cerns the Federal Reserve System because a
large amount of U.S. currency is being shipped
overseas, partly to finance multiple-payment
options (see Porter and Judson [1996]).
What is particularly fascinating is that people’s
use of a foreign currency in addition to their
own government’s fiat currency arises sponta-
neously (in response to market desires) rather
than by government edict. Hence, governments’
traditional reasons for circulating fiat currency
(legal restrictions, use of fiat currency to dis-
charge tax liabilities) fail to explain why a
country’s citizens would adopt fiat currency
issued by a foreign sovereign as a medium of
exchange. Consequently, to understand how 
a foreign currency comes to circulate in the
domestic economy, one must model the private
decision to accept foreign currency in exchange
for goods and services. This is especially impor-
tant for policymakers who wish to “drive out” 
a foreign currency or increase the acceptability
of the domestic one. To do so, they must under-
stand the foreign currency’s fundamental bene-
fits and costs.
In this article, we discuss recent research on
dual-currency economies, focusing on mone-
tary search models. Search models have special
applicability to dual-currency economies
because they explicitly model economic agents’
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decisions to accept a fiat currency in trade.
They also yield insights concerning what the
local government can do to alter the accept-
ability of the foreign relative to the domestic
currency. The rest of this article is structured
as follows: In section I, we present a simple
one-country, two-currency search model of
money to illustrate the acceptability of multiple
currencies. Section II surveys the findings of
dual-currency models from the search-theory
literature. In section III, we use our simple
model to study the policies used by one
country, Ukraine, to increase the acceptability
of a newly issued domestic currency and elimi-
nate the acceptability of the dollar as a medium
of exchange.
I. A Simple Dual-
Currency Model
The fundamental purpose of search-theoretic
models is to describe the trading frictions that
produce the intrinsically useless object called
money. The key friction in these models is the
absence of a double coincidence of wants,
which implies that bilateral trade (barter) is not
possible and thus some payment system is
needed before trade can occur. A dual-currency
economy simply allows more than one object
to serve as a medium of exchange. Several
models of the type considered here appear in
Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996), Li and
Wright (1998) and Wallace (1998).
Preferences
Agents in this economy consume and produce
goods and services but cannot produce their
desired consumption good; hence, they must
trade in order to consume. There are k > 3
types of goods in the economy distributed
along the unit circle. Goods are divisible and
nonstorable (services). An agent who produces
good i desires good i +1 for consumption;
consequently, a double coincidence of wants is
not possible between a given pair of agents.
The probability of a single coincidence of
wants is given by x =1/k. Agents receive utility
from consumption u(q), where q is the quan-
tity of their consumption good and u8(q) > 0,
u9(q) < 0 and u(0) = 0. Agents’ disutility from
production is given by c(q), with c8(q) > 0,
c9(q) $ 0 and, c(0) = 0. It is also assumed that
u8(0) –c8(0)>0, and that there is some value
of – q such that u( – q ) – c( – q )=0. The number of
agents in the economy is normalized to 1.
Agents do not trade in centralized markets
but rather search for suitable trading partners.
Individuals meet at random with probability 
a and meet only one person at a given point 
in time.1 It is typically assumed that trading
histories are private information, which makes
trade credit impossible. Hence, some other
payment mechanism is necessary for trade.
That mechanism is money.
Money
Besides production goods, another type of
good exists in this economy—money. While
most search models study fiat currency, which
is intrinsically worthless (that is, it provides no
utility) but is costless to carry around, other
models assume that money generates some
basic cost (such as storage or transportation) or
benefit (for example, aesthetic beauty), inde-
pendent of its use as a medium of exchange.
To capture all of these possibilities, we assume
that a holder of currency i incurs a per-period
holding cost (benefit) of ti > 0 (< 0). For ti =0,
the currency is truly a costless fiat currency.
Unlike a consumption good, money is
durable. For analytical reasons, we assume that
money is indivisible and agents can carry only
one unit at a time.2 We also assume that agents
cannot produce until they have consumed.3 As
a result of this assumption, there are only two
possible trading states for agents in this econ-
omy: They hold either 0 units of money (sell-
ers) or 1 unit of money (buyers). Let M denote
the proportion of agents in the economy who
hold money, and m0 = 1 – M denote the pro-
portion of sellers. Since we have two curren-
cies, let m1 denote the proportion of agents in
the economy holding currency 1, and let m2
denote the proportion holding currency 2. 
It then follows that M = m1 + m2 and that 
m0 + m1 + m2 = 1.
n 1 This is modeled more formally and precisely by saying that 
meetings occur according to a Poisson process with arrival rate a.
n 2 This is typically done to avoid having to solve for the steady-state
distribution of money holdings and trading prices.
n 3 This eliminates transactions in which money trades for money
plus some goods. Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) analyze a model in
which these types are allowed.
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Bargaining
We consider equilibria in which a money
holder meets a seller who produces the money
holder’s preferred good. We assume that in
such a meeting the buyer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer which entails specifying an
amount of the good for the unit of currency.
The seller must decide whether to accept this
offer or go on. This is true for either currency.
Furthermore, if the offer is accepted, the money
holder must judge it worthwhile to give up the
unit of currency for the consumption good.
Returns to Search
Given the structure above, we can write down















where i = 0 denotes sellers, i = 1 denotes
holders of currency 1, and i = 2 denotes hold-
ers of currency 2. Vi denotes the value function
for a trader of type i and measures the expected
present discounted value of utility from trading
in the future, given that the current trading
position is i. The parameter r is the real interest
rate, qi is the quantity of goods given up by a
seller for currency i, and ti is the per-period
cost associated with holding currency i. In
addition, the parameter II0
i,i =1, 2 denotes the
probability (as perceived by the buyer) that a
seller will accept currency i in return for goods.
The parameter p0
i captures the seller’s decision
to accept or reject an offer to trade his good for
currency i. If p0
i = 1, the currency is accepted
by the seller as payment; if p0
i = 0, the seller
chooses not to accept the currency. In a Nash
equilibrium with identical sellers, p0
i = II0
i, 
for i = 1, 2.
The right sides of equations (1) and (2)
denote the expected return from trading. This 
is the probability of a buyer meeting a seller
who has his desired consumption good, times
the utility from consuming qi, minus the cost of
switching from a buyer to a seller (V0 –Vi). If
this payoff is positive or zero, the buyer makes
the trade; if it is negative, he does not. No other
match of agents yields a payoff, since money
holders who meet money holders do not trade
currencies and because trading currency 1 for
currency 2 plus some goods is ruled out by
assumption. For the sellers, equation (3) is the
expected return from producing qi for a unit of
currency i and then reversing roles. If this pay-
off is positive or zero, the seller chooses p0
i =1;
if the payoff is negative, the seller does not
accept the currency and sets p0
i = 0. If the seller
is indifferent as to accepting the money or
rejecting the offer of money for goods, 0 < p0
i < 1;
in other words, the seller flips a coin to decide
whether to accept the currency. In the latter
case, we say that a currency is only partially
acceptable in trade.
Given our bargaining assumptions, the
buyer’s offer leaves the seller indifferent as to
accepting the offer or walking away. Since the
payoff is non-negative, the seller accepts the




Furthermore, for the offer to be acceptable to




Hence, (6) and (7) are the buyer’s incentive-
compatibility constraints. Combining (4)–(7)
implies that bargains acceptable to both sides
must satisfy u(qi) – c(qi) $ 0 for i = 1, 2.
n 4 In this case, the seller could choose any value of 0 $po
i $1,
since he is indifferent. However, the buyer can always decide to accept a
slightly smaller quantity of goods in return for the currency. This would
make it rational for the seller to set  po
i = 1, since he receives a positive
surplus from trading.
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A Dual-Currency
Equilibrium
Consider the equilibrium in which both curren-
cies are fully acceptable, p0
i =II0
i =1, for i =1,2.
This corresponds to a dual-currency economy.
Under full acceptability and buyer-take-all bar-
gaining, equations (3)–(5) imply that V0=0. In
short, since buyers extract all the surplus from
trade, the value of being a seller is zero.5 All
that remains is to determine the quantities q1
and q2 that can then be used to solve for V1
and V2 through equations (4)–(5). Substituting
(4)–(5) into (1)–(2) for V1 and V2, with V0=0,
yields
(8) c(q2)+t2/r =axm0[u(q2)–c(q2)] /r
and
(9) c(q1)+t1/r =axm0[u(q1)–c(q1)]/r.
Equations (8)–(9) yield two independent
equations in two unknowns, q1 and q2. If (8)
and (9) have a solution, (q*1,q * 2), in which the
equations’ right side is positive, then we have a
steady-state equilibrium that satisfies the buyer’s
incentive-compatibility constraints.
Since (8) and (9) are functionally the same
equation, we can illustrate the solution to both
with figure 1. The right side of (8) and (9) is the
expected present discounted value of the surplus
from trading minus the holding cost and, given
our assumptions on the utility and cost func-
tions, is the hump-shaped curve in figure 1. The
left side of (8) and (9) is an upward-sloping
function in q with an intercept of ti/r, which
depends on the time cost of holding money of
type i, ti, normalized by the interest rate, r. For
t1= t2 = 0, it is relatively easy to show that a
nonzero solution to (8) and (9) exists, is unique,
and satisfies the buyer’s incentive-compatibility
constraints. The values of (q*1,q * 2) that solve
this equation will be a function of the parame-
ters governing the trading environment and the
preferences of the individual agent. The deci-
sion to accept a currency is endogenous and
also a function of these fundamentals; we do
not impose the currency’s use from outside the
model. Hence, we are able to derive the exis-
tence of a dual-currency equilibrium for an opti-
mizing model of exchange in which the accept-
ability of the currencies is endogenously
determined.
For the case of t1, t2 > 0, we will have either
two solutions to each equation, (qL
i , qH
i  ), or no
solution.6 In this situation, holding money is
costly, so a seller must be compensated for giv-
ing up his good to accept money and incur this
holding cost. If the cost of holding money is
sufficiently low, then there are a low and a
high equilibrium. Again, if t1=t2, the two solu-
tions are the same for both currencies, since
they are indistinguishable. As this cost increases,
the low and high equilibrium values converge
until, for sufficiently high costs, no equilibrium
exists. In short, sellers demand such a high
payoff to overcome the holding cost of money
when becoming buyers that no trade exists,
which is incentive-compatible for current buy-
ers. Figure 1 shows how a single-currency equi-
librium arises. If t1 is sufficiently small and t2 is
sufficiently large, then private agents will use
currency 1 but not currency 2 to trade, and vice
versa. Thus, if the government can manipulate
these two holding costs, it can alter the accept-





















n 5 If we assumed an alternative bargaining structure, such as Nash
bargaining, V0would be greater than zero but it would be harder to derive
the equilibrium quantities traded.
n 6 On the other hand, if holding a unit of money provides a net 
benefit in and of itself, ti < 0, then if a monetary equilibrium exists, it will
be unique. This would be shown in figure 1 by shifting c(qi) down to
reflect a negative intercept. As a result, the two curves would intersect 
once in the positive quadrant, if at all.
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We will return to this idea in section III to dis-
cuss a case in which one government accom-
plished this feat by altering the relative transac-
tion costs to “de-dollarize” its economy.
Implications of the
Model
Several important aspects of the model are
worth mentioning. First, for t1,t2 > 0, there are
multiple monetary equilibria. This common fea-
ture of search models illustrates the importance
of focusing on the dynamics of the model to
determine which equilibria are stable and
which unstable. However, it is possible to
Pareto-rank the two equilibria—qi
H yields the
higher equilibrium value of Vi. Since produc-
tion is costly, sellers will be willing to incur
the greater disutility of producing qi
H only if 
the unit of currency they receive in return is
more highly valued. As a result, unless
Vi(qH)>   Vi(qL), it would not be rational to
produce qH rather than qL.
Second, the currency values are independent
of one another, that is, q1 does not depend on
q2, and vice versa. In general, we would expect
economic fundamentals that change the value
of one currency to change the value of the
other currency as well. For example, if the
holding cost of one currency increases, we
might expect to see currency substitution to
occur as people move from the high-cost cur-
rency to the other one. Portfolio reallocation of
this type does not happen here.
Third, the only difference between the two
currencies’ values results from the ad hoc
cost/benefit ratio of holding the currencies. 
In the case where t1 = t2, it is also true that
q1 = q2, since (8) and (9) are identical. This
means that the two currencies are identical. If
that is so, why use more than one? The use of
two different currencies suggests that there is a
fundamental difference between them; the
model above suggests that the difference is
related to the holding costs or benefits of each
currency rather than the trading environment.
Fourth, currency trades do not occur in the
model because of the one-unit-of-money inven-
tory restriction.7 Consequently, no nominal
exchange rate exists in the model. Neverthe-
less, an implicit real exchange rate exists, given
by the ratio of q1/q2. However, it will differ
from 1 only if t1 ?t2. In short, the real exchange
rate depends on costs that are determined
outside the model rather than on the trading
environment or on preferences.
Fifth, the relative amounts of the two curren-
cies in the economy, m1 and m2, do not influ-
ence the equilibrium quantities of goods. This
is a result of the buyer-take-all assumption.
The values m1 and m2 appear in the returns
to search only for the seller, rV0. But with the
buyer-take-all condition, V0 = 0 for all values of
m1 and m2. Consequently, the actual stocks of
each currency are irrelevant for determining
their equilibrium values. This result would
change if we adopted a more general bargaining
structure such that both parties gain from trade.
Sixth, the closed-economy assumption used
here is plausible for two domestic currencies.
However, in most dual economies today, one
of the currencies is foreign. Hence, the model
ignores the fact that the foreign currency enters
the economy in some fashion and also leaves
the economy through purchases of imported
goods. Therefore, the model is clearly missing
an important feature of dual-currency economies,
namely, trading interactions with other econ-
omies. To address this issue, one needs a two-
country, two-currency model of money.
Finally, in the current set-up, it is difficult to
see exactly how government policy can affect
the equilibrium values of q1 and q2, since they
depend only on the fundamentals of the trad-
ing environment and on preferences. Unless
one argues (as we did above) that the govern-
ment can alter the fundamental costs of holding
the two currencies, a more elaborate formula-
tion is needed to capture fully the government’s
role in the search model.
As the foregoing discussion points out, 
the simple model outlined above is lacking in
many dimensions, despite its appealing features
for endogenously determining the acceptability
of fiat currencies. In the next section, we review
the literature to show how the simple search
model described here can be amended to
include more interesting and realistic features
of dual-currency economies.
n 7 There are equilibria in this model in which a unit of currency 1
trades for a unit of currency 2 plus some amount of goods and vice versa.
However, these trades cannot occur if we assume that consumption must
precede production, since they require the currency-2 money trader to 
produce twice before consuming.
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In their first paper on search models of money,
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) look at the possibility
of two commodity monies circulating in a
closed economy. In this model, agents produce
an indivisible good and then carry it with them
in search of trading partners. As a result, there
are real storage and transportation costs associ-
ated with goods production. Kiyotaki and
Wright then ask whether one or more of the
commodities will be accepted by traders who
do not want the good for consumption pur-
poses. They show that in certain equilibria,
one of the goods uniquely serves as commodity
money (the low-storage-cost good); in other
equilibria, two of the goods circulate as money
(the two lowest-cost goods). The authors
explore whether a good that is useless to all
traders but has zero storage costs can circulate
as money—a true fiat currency. They show that
there are equilibria in which both the commod-
ity money and fiat money circulate. Thus, this
was the first search model that looked at dual-
currency issues.
In a 1993 paper, the same authors present
a more elegant description of the indivisible-
good-and-money search model and its solution.
They explore the coexistence of two fiat cur-
rencies that have different dividends or storage
costs, similar to t1 and t2 in the model described
in section I. They show that there are equilibria
in which both currencies circulate. Similar
equilibria are derived in Aiyagari and Wallace
(1992). One interesting feature of Kiyotaki and
Wright’s results is that even if the two curren-
cies have identical storage costs (t1 = t2 in the
model above), they may have different accept-
abilities and thus different expected exchange
values. Kiyotaki and Wright show that an equi-
librium exists in which one currency is fully
acceptable (II 1
0 =1) while the other is only par-
tially acceptable (0 < II 2
0< 1). Since it is less
widely accepted, the value of holding it is
lower. This is an appealing finding for those of
the developing and transitional economies
where the foreign currency is not universally
accepted in exchange. Thus, the dual-currency
equilibria with different acceptabilities mimic a
real-world feature of dual-currency economies.
Divisible Goods
Kiyotaki and Wright’s finding that two identical
currencies can have different trading values is
puzzling, given our model showing that if
t1=t2, the two currencies will have the same
equilibrium exchange value. What is the reason
for these contradictory results? The different
exchange values result from having a partially
acceptable currency, which in turn results from
the use of mixed strategies when goods are
indivisible. Mixed strategies come into play
when sellers are indifferent as to accepting or
rejecting money in exchange for an indivisible
unit of the good. Shi (1995) and Trejos and
Wright (1995a) demonstrate that when goods
are divisible, the buyer can always offer to take
an infinitesimally smaller amount of the good
to ensure that the seller is not indifferent and
trade occurs. Since the seller will always accept
such an offer, partial acceptability never occurs.
Thus, while introduction of divisible goods into
the standard search models was a great step
forward in understanding exchange, it elimi-
nated an empirically relevant equilibrium,
namely, the partial acceptability of one of the
currencies. Amending the search model to
generate partial acceptability (when only some
sellers accept the foreign currency all of the
time) remains to be done.
Another feature of the equilibrium derived in
the model in section I is that if t1=t2, both cur-
rencies circulate at par. How can we generate
different trading values of the currencies in the
model above? Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright
(1996) show that there are more equilibria in
our simple model than we discuss: An equilib-
rium exists in which one currency is perceived
to have more value than the other. In pairings
of currency-1 and currency-2 money traders,
currencies are exchanged and the holder of the
less valuable currency (the seller) also gives up
some goods. To see this, suppose agents believe
for some reason that currency 2 is more valu-
able than currency 1. One can think of these
equilibria as ones in which the seller “gives
change”—trades some of the good for the cur-
rency but also gives the buyer change (the
seller’s currency). This version of the model
would alter equations (1)–(3) as follows 
(setting V0 = 0 and II 1
0 = II 2
0 = 1, for i =1, 2.):
(10) rV2 =axm0[u(q2)– V2]–t2
+axm1[u(q12)+   V1–V2] ,
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2000 Q18
(11) rV1 =axm0[u(q1)– V1]–t1
+axm2[–c(q12) + V2–V1] ,
and
(12) rV0 = 0,
where q12 is the quantity of goods given up by
a currency 1 holder in addition to his unit of
currency 1 in return for a unit of currency 2.
Assuming that the currency 2 holder makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the currency 1 holder,
the bargaining conditions for q1, q2, and q12 are
(13) V1 = c(q1),
(14) V2 = c(q2),
(15) V2 –V1=c(q12),
and
(16) V2 –V1 #u(q12),
where (16) is the incentive-compatibility con-
straint for the currency 2 holder in a “making
change” trade. Equations (15)–(16) imply
u(q12) $ c(q12). Substituting (13)–(15) into
(10)–(11) and then subtracting (10) from (11),
with t1=t2, yields
(17) c(q2)+t2 /r = {axm0[u(q2)–c(q2)] 
+axm1[u(q12)–c(q12)]}/r ,
(18) c(q1)+t1/r = axm0[u(q1)–c(q1)]/r ,
and
(19) c(q12)= {axm0[u(q2)–u(q1)] 
+axm1[u(q12)–c(q12)]}/ (r +axm1).
Equation (18) is the same as equation (9),
so the solution for q1 is the same as before.
However, it is clear from (17) that, since the
last term must be positive for “making change”
trades to occur, q2 > q1 if a monetary equilib-
rium exists. Finally, q2 > q1 implies that (19)
yields a positive value for q12 (under appropri-
ate parameter values).
The point of this example is that even
though the two currencies are fundamentally
the same, as long as traders believe that one of
the two is more valuable, it will be in equilib-
rium, and currency 2 will trade for currency 1 if
the currency 1 trader gives a “side payment” of
q12. One last point is that, in this example, the
quantity q2 coming out of (17) depends on q12,
while the value of q12 that solves (19) depends
on both q1 and q2. Thus, unlike the equilibrium
studied in section I, the values of the two cur-
rencies in this equilibrium are interdependent.
Shi (1995) proposes an alternative method
for generating different trading values for fun-
damentally equivalent currencies. He assumes
that different currencies are associated with dif-
ferent bargaining arrangements. For one cur-
rency, the bargaining rule is buyer take all, with
the seller getting zero surplus from the trade;
the other currency trades under a Nash bargain-
ing rule in which the surplus of trade is split
between the buyer and seller. In short, Shi
assumes that the bargaining conditions in
(4)–(5) now look like
(48) V1 = c (q1) +V0
and
(58) V2>c (q2)+V0 .
Under this formulation, sellers expect to
receive a positive surplus if they trade for cur-
rency 2, but no surplus when they trade for
currency 1. Shi then shows that both currencies
can circulate in trade but with different trading
values, since sellers view the two currencies
differently. However, it is not clear why traders
would adopt different bargaining strategies
based solely on the currency’s national origin.
Gresham’s Law
The one-country, two-currency framework has
also been used to study Gresham’s Law, which
posits that “bad money drives out good.” Velde,
Weber, and Wright (1999) use a search model
to study this long-standing issue. Their frame-
work features a commodity money that yields a
dividend to its holder; good money generates a
higher dividend than bad. In the model above,
this would correspond to currency 1 being the
good one and currency 2 being the bad one by
setting t1, t2 < 0 and t1 < t2. Velde, Weber, and
Wright assume that some sellers have imperfect
information and cannot determine which
currency they are trading for. This creates a
“lemons” problem—uninformed sellers are not
willing to produce a sufficient amount of the
commodity for the good money, since they are
afraid of getting the bad money in return. The
authors show that under some parameters,
holders of the good money will not trade with
these uninformed sellers, who undervalue 
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the good currency. In this sense, Gresham’s




As we mentioned earlier, the coexistence of 
privately issued bank notes and government-
issued currency (“outside” money) has a long
history in the United States. However, in the
typical search model, no individual can unilat-
erally issue his own commodity-backed cur-
rency, since it would have to be redeemable at
some point—an impossibility if all trading his-
tories are private information. Cavalcanti and
Wallace (1999) loosen this assumption and
allow the trading histories of a subset of agents
to be public information. These agents can then
effectively function as banks and thus issue
commodity-backed banknotes. Calvalcanti and
Wallace show that banknotes and government-
issued currency can coexist if the supply of
outside money is sufficiently scarce.
Government Policy
Although the government is implicitly present
in the search models as the creator of fiat cur-
rency, a prototypical search model lacks an
active government and so has very little analy-
sis of government policy.8 Incorporating gov-
ernment into search models typically means
assuming that the government is a subset of
agents in the economy who adopt various
strategies for trading when matched with pri-
vate agents. With regard to government policy
in dual-currency economies, Curtis and Waller
(2000) argue that a policy in developing and
transitional economies commonly makes the
foreign currency illegal for internal trade. To
give this illegality any meaning, however, the
government must enforce the policy. Curtis and
Waller adopt Li’s (1995) approach, assuming
that when government agents meet private
agents who hold foreign currency 1, they either
confiscate the currency or impose a fine.9 Li
assumes that a proportion g of the agents in the
economy are government agents, with g =g0+ g1,
where g0 is the proportion of government
agents without a unit of currency 1 and g1 is
the proportion of government agents holding a
unit of the foreign currency 1. Upon meeting a
holder of currency 1, government agents with-
out a unit of currency confiscate the currency
and use it to buy goods from sellers according
to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In addition, the
government imposes a fine on using the foreign
currency which corresponds to having t1> 0
and t2 = 0. Under this set of assumptions, the
returns to search equations (1) and (2) become
(20) rV2= axm0[u(q2)– V2] 
and
(21) rV1= axm0[u(q1)–V1]–g0 [V1–V0–t1].
The second term in (21) is the expected cost
to a holder of currency 1 of having the currency
confiscated by the government agent and pay-
ing the fine. Curtis and Waller show that in
some variants of the model, increased enforce-
ment of currency restrictions lowers the trading
value of the foreign currency and can drive it
out of the economy while strengthening the
value of the domestic currency. In figure 1, this
would correspond to increasing t1 to the point
where currency 1 is not accepted.
Li and Wright (1998) take a different
approach to studying policy. They too assume
that government agents produce goods for
money, but rather than accepting a currency
according to optimizing behavior, they base
acceptance on an exogenously determined
trading rule. They examine a dual-currency
economy to see whether a government strategy
of “accept domestic currency, reject foreign cur-
rency” can drive the foreign currency out of cir-
culation. The model presented in section I can
be amended to illustrate this argument. Let cur-
rency 1 be the foreign currency. Let g be the
proportion of government agents in the econ-
omy, with g = g0 + g2, where g0 is the propor-
tion of government sellers in the economy and
g2 is the proportion of government agents hold-
ing a unit of the domestic currency 2. The
adding-up constraint requires that 1 = m0 + m1
+ m2 + g, which implies m0 = 1–m1 –m2–g.
Government buyers make take-it-or-leave-it
offers to sellers and accept such offers of cur-
rency 2 but not currency 1. The returns to
search for holders of currency 1 and currency 2,
n 8 Ritter (1995) explicitly models the government as a subset of
private agents who get together and issue currency and adopt the strategy
that they will always accept the currency in trade. However, it is hard to
distinguish a government from a private bank in his model. Dual currencies
would reflect currencies issued by competing private banks or by competing
governments, either state or local.
n 9 In single-currency models, confiscation by the government is
considered equivalent to an inflation tax.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2000 Q110
given earlier in equations (1) and (2), are now
given by
(208) rV2= axm0[u(q2)–V2]–t2  
+ axg0[u(qg2)–V2]
and
(218) rV 1= ax (1–m1–m2–g)[u (q1)–V1]–t1,
where qg2 is the quantity of goods a govern-
ment agent gives up for a unit of currency 2.
From these two equations we see that as g
increases, all else being equal, the value of
holding currency 1 falls, while the correspond-
ing increase in g increases V2 through the
increase in g0. Thus, Li and Wright show that 
if government is a large enough subset of the
population, its transaction strategy will succeed
in driving the foreign currency out of circulation.
Velde, Weber, and Wright (1999) adopt a dif-
ferent approach to modeling government pol-
icy in their study of Gresham’s Law. They have
the government adopt a debasement policy
whereby private agents can bring in the high-
value commodity money and convert it to the
low-value commodity money. The private
agent gets some of the surplus commodity from
reminting for consumption purposes, and the
government gets some of the commodity as
seigniorage revenue. For certain parameteriza-
tions of their model, all holders of the good
money will choose to remint their coins; thus,
government seigniorage policy is capable of
driving out one of the currencies.
Multiple Money 
Holdings
All the models described so far share one key
assumption—the restriction that agents cannot
hold more than one unit of money. Allowing
agents to hold more implies that the proportion
of agents holding a certain quantity of money is
not constant, since people buy their way into
and sell their way out of a level of money hold-
ings. Permitting agents to hold multiple units
requires solving for a steady-state distribution
of money holdings in addition to all the quanti-
ties traded between a large (possibly infinite)
number of traders who enter into bargaining
with differing levels of money holdings. While
research has begun to move in this direction
for one-country, one-currency models (see
Molico [1998], Camera and Corbae [1999], and
Green and Zhou [1998]), very little has been
done for two-currency, multiple-money holding
search models. An exception is the work of
Craig and Waller (1999), which examines how
agents choose to hold portfolios of currencies
and how the government’s “inflation tax” poli-
cies affect the values of these portfolios. That
model merges the inflation-tax model of Li
(1995) with the multiple-units-of-money model
of Camera and Corbae (1999). Although we do
obtain some analytical results, in general the
model must be solved using numerical meth-
ods. We find equilibria that mimic the simple
model above: If the currencies are fundamen-
tally equivalent (no inflation tax), then similar
portfolios will have similar value in trade. Fur-
thermore, when the currencies are fundamen-
tally different because of their inflation-tax risk,
we find parameterizations in which currency
trades for currency plus goods in equilibrium
(the Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright [1996] result
for portfolios or currencies). We also find para-
meterizations in which currency trades for cur-
rency. This latter result is interesting in that cur-
rency-for-currency trades occur when a single
coincidence of wants does not arise; hence,
there are pure financial trades in the model.
Also, the existence of currency trades creates
an explicit nominal and real exchange rate.10
A typical dual-currency search model has an
implicit endogenous real exchange rate but no
endogenous nominal exchange rate.
Two-Country, Two-
Currency Models
Until now, all of the models discussed were
closed-economy models with multiple media 
of exchange. In addition to two-currency, one-
country models, a fair amount of research has
tried to capture the open-economy aspects of
dual-currency models.
The earliest two-country, two-currency
search model that we know of is Matsuyama,
Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993). Their paper uses
the simple indivisible-commodity, indivisible-
money model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993),
but designates agents as coming from different
countries. These agents are randomly paired
with agents from their own country and the
other country and then decide to trade or not.
A key issue is whether one or both currencies
will be acceptable in international pairings of
n 10 There is actually a distribution of nominal and real exchange
rates, since individual pairs of traders can specify different quantities of
goods and currencies to be exchanged, depending on the portfolio com-
position of the buyer and seller. This is equivalent to the price distributions
obtained by Camera and Corbae (1999). 
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traders. Furthermore, the authors consider con-
ditions under which the foreign currency will
be used as a medium of exchange between
two domestic traders. In this model, no cur-
rency exchange occurs, despite its international
flavor; due to the indivisibilities of goods and
money, the implied real exchange rate is 1.
Zhou (1997) amends the Matsuyama, Kiy-
otaki, and Matsui model to generate currency
exchange. He assumes that some home agents
desire home goods produced by home agents,
while others desire goods produced by foreign
agents. However, agents’ preferences are sub-
ject to random shocks, which means they may
switch from home goods to foreign goods or
vice versa. In this set-up, home-goods produc-
ers who prefer to consume other home goods
never accept foreign currency from foreign
buyers. However, home-goods producers who
want to consume foreign goods will accept for-
eign currency to pay for that consumption.
Consequently, at any point in time, there are
buyers of country 1 with country-2 currency
and vice versa. At each point, some of these
traders receive a shock that reverses their con-
sumption preferences so that they now want to
consume home goods. But home-goods sellers
will not accept the foreign currency and the
buyer does not want to use it to buy foreign
goods. Consequently, buyers are stuck with
the foreign currency unless they are paired
with a foreign agent who is holding the home
currency and has also experienced a preference
reversal. As a result, in each period there is
some currency exchange between country-1
buyers holding currency 2 and country-2 buy-
ers holding currency 1. Although Zhou gener-
ates currency exchange in this model, the nom-
inal exchange is always 1:1 because of the
restriction that agents can hold only one unit of
either currency.
Trejos and Wright (1995b, 1996) extend the
model of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui by
allowing for divisible goods. They derive condi-
tions under which a) both currencies are
national; b) there is one national and one inter-
national currency; and c) both currencies are
international. Furthermore, they show that the
currencies will have different trade values
depending on several factors such as the prob-
ability of meeting someone from one’s own
versus the other country, the relative quantities
of the two currencies in circulation, and
whether the transaction occurs between two
traders from the same country or traders from
two different countries. They show that if the
economies are symmetric and both currencies
circulate internationally, then they have equal
trading value. This is similar to the findings
of the model in section I. Trejos and Wright
also incorporate different government policies
following the method of Li (1995) to see
whether wildly different government inflation
policies can either drive out the foreign 
currency for internal trades or cause it to be
used for internal trade. In this set-up, each gov-
ernment’s agents confiscate their own currency
from traders they meet, regardless of their
nationalities.




In this section, we describe a government’s
confrontation with the problem of making its
new fiat currency, the hryvna, acceptable in a
dollarized economy. The government also
wanted to de-dollarize the economy in order to
secure more seigniorage revenues. The country
is Ukraine, which introduced the hryvna as part
of its 1994 currency reform.
After the ruble zone collapsed, Ukraine
issued its own currency, which was a coupon
(although it behaved exactly like explicit fiat
currency). Seigniorage considerations led to a
rapid increase in the issue of these coupons,
which produced hyperinflation of 10,000 per-
cent in 1994. The result was massive currency
substitution by Ukrainian citizens and the dol-
larization of the nation’s economy. After stabi-
lizing inflation by restraining the issuance of
coupons, the government faced the challenge
of issuing a new fiat currency—the hryvna—
and inducing Ukrainian citizens to use it rather
than dollars. Made cautious by the previous
hyperinflation, however, citizens seemed reluc-
tant to give up their dollars for hryvnas.
This situation can be described by our model
in section I. Let currency 1 be the dollar and
currency 2 be the hryvna. We showed that if t1
was sufficiently low and t2 sufficiently high, the
dollar would be acceptable in trade but the
hryvna would not be. This is, in some sense,
similar to the situation that confronted Ukraine’s
central bank when it introduced its new currency.
Given the analysis in our model, how could
the central bank reverse this situation? It had to
figure out a way to lower the holding cost of
the hryvna and raise that of the dollar as a
medium of exchange. Raising the costs of using
the dollar was easy—make it illegal and
enforce the laws strictly enough to drive it out
of the economy. This is the result Curtis and
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Waller (2000) report for currency restrictions.
How could the government lower the cost of
using the hryvna? Since it had generated hyper-
inflation very recently, its promises to keep
inflation low were probably not credible. With
this in mind, we can think of the holding cost
as the utility loss arising from the risk of deval-
uation through hyperinflation. Since the threat
of another hyperinflation was very real, sellers
demanded such a high premium to accept the
local currency that using it as a medium of
exchange was not worthwhile. Unless the hold-
ing cost of the hryvna fell, the launch of the
new currency would fail.
The government needed a commitment
device to lower the cost of using the hryvna yet
make it easy to switch back to dollars should
inflation get out of control. The government
decided to make it very easy to obtain a license
to set up a currency-exchange booth. As a
result, booths sprouted up all over (particularly
in Kiev), with three dramatic effects on citizens’
willingness to hold the local currency. The
proliferation of exchange points made it easy
to exchange the currency in a hurry; this mini-
mized the nonpecuniary “shoe-leather” costs 
of converting the hryvna into dollars, thereby
increasing the hryvna’s liquidity. Second,
competition among the multitude of currency
exchanges lowered the buy–sell spread almost
to zero, which made the pecuniary costs of
currency conversion almost nil.11 Finally, since
all currency exchanges posted the exchange
rate, they acted as an information loudspeaker
regarding the behavior of current monetary
policy. Simply by glancing in the windows as
one walked around the city, it was very easy to
see if the hryvna was depreciating as a result of
loose monetary policy. In short, the presence
of competitive currency exchanges dramatically
lowered the cost of holding the new currency.
By recognizing how the fundamentals of trad-
ing affected the acceptability of currencies, the
Ukrainian government was able to launch a
new currency and significantly reduce the
dollarization of its economy.
IV. Concluding
Thoughts
The purpose of this article is to examine how
modern monetary theory aids our understand-
ing of an old and venerable multiple-payments
system—the dual-currency economy. Dual-
currency economies persist today as a way to
avoid devaluation of domestic currencies,
unstable banking systems, and government
restrictions on trade using other means of pay-
ment. Monetary search models are very useful
for studying how currency acceptability arises
endogenously in economies that lack more
sophisticated payment systems. While search
models’ basic assumptions may not be consis-
tent with modern financial systems, they pro-
vide fairly good descriptions of transitional and
developing economies. In particular, the
economies of the former Soviet Union are well
described by the basic assumption of the
search models—an absence of credit, a lack of
smoothly functioning banking systems, reliance
on currency as the sole medium of exchange,
and primitive trading environments. Thus, the
application of dual-currency search models to
these economies should yield interesting case
studies of monetary theory and will offer
potentially helpful policy prescriptions for the
beleaguered governments of these countries.
n 11 In June 1998, the buy–sell spread in downtown Kiev was Z\x cent
per dollar exchanged, or 50 cents per $100. There were no fixed
commissions on exchanges.
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